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RES PUBLICA: PUBLIC OPINION,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME
COURT’S 2010 TERM
Bruce G. Peabody* & Peter J. Woolley**
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2011, Fairleigh Dickinson University’s polling
organization, PublicMind, conducted a national survey on the substantive
issues underlying four constitutional cases decided during the 2010
Supreme Court term. These cases involved an array of specific legal
problems, including those posed by state tax credits for donations
supporting religious schools, questioning of minors without parental
consent, prison overcrowding, and the appropriate regulation of violent
video games. More broadly, they encompassed many of the most charged
and salient areas of contemporary constitutional discussion including
federalism, free speech, and criminal procedure.
While it is not particularly unusual to ask the public about its views on
previously decided cases or established areas of constitutional controversy,
the PublicMind polls were conducted before the pertinent cases were
decided. Additionally, each case presented a novel legal issue. In this way,
the polls were intended to provide a measure of the public’s views of the
substantive questions at issue and not public opinion about cases already
decided by the Supreme Court.
In this Essay for Fordham Law Review’s Res Gestae, we present these
cases and our polling results, with three primary goals. In Part I we make
the case for the utility and importance of examining the public’s views on
these issues, a perspective that may not be obvious to many readers. In Part
II we highlight the cases considered and their significance—both on their
own and in the context of understanding the Court’s 2010 term as a whole.
Finally, we present our results with the hope that readers will take these
findings seriously and consider additional ways in which one might explore
the relationship between the public’s views, constitutional law, and the
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.

* Bruce G. Peabody is Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University.
** Peter J. Woolley is Executive Director, PublicMind and Professor of Comparative
Politics, Fairleigh Dickinson University.
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I. EXPLAINING THE INTERSECTION OF POLLING AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: THE “GOVERNANCE AS DIALOGUE” MOVEMENT
At first glance, the prospect of polling the public on the constitutional
issues in pending Supreme Court cases seems dubious—possibly even
subversive of cherished legal values. According to traditional if not
orthodox narratives dating back as far as The Federalist Papers, the
Supreme Court is insulated through life tenure, salary protection, and other
guarantees in Article III of the Constitution, from both the executive and
legislative branches and the “occasional ill humors” that course through
society and the public.1 Turning to public opinion on constitutional matters
might seem to threaten this structural divide between the people and their
judicial agents. In turn, a move like this could impede the Court’s ability to
ensure “a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws” and
protect “the rights of citizens.”2
But our interest in the public’s views on constitutional issues has a
different backdrop, with a different set of assumptions about the Court.
Since the 1960s, a rising chorus of scholarly voices has contributed to a
“governance as dialogue” movement, which presumes we must appreciate
the different contributions of Congress, the executive branch, the states,
organized interests, and the people as a whole in order to comprehend the
Constitution’s evolving place in our lives.3 Constitutional meaning, in this
picture, is formed by an intricate “dialogue” amongst many participants, a
political and legal back and forth in which the courts are just one, albeit
important, player.4
The governance as dialogue literature is diverse and growing. But
surveying the public’s views on emerging constitutional issues can play a
valuable orienting role in this somewhat crowded scholarly thicket.
Specifically, our recent polling efforts can assist researchers in four broad
areas of inquiry.
A. Popular Constitutionalism and Surveys of the Public
First, polling the public can be an important part of identifying the
contours of “popular constitutionalism”—the public’s ability to engage and
discuss constitutional issues. Whatever interest we might have in
appraising the impact of the “public” on constitutional decisions, it can be
challenging to identify precisely what this phenomenon references or
includes.5 Who are “the People” to whom we devote so much political and
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. Id.
3. See MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL: INTERACTIONS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2009) (discussing “governance as
dialogue”).
4. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL
PROCESS 231–47 (1988) (discussing “coordinate construction” as constitutional
interpretation by all three branches of federal government).
5. See William E. Forbath, The Will of the People? Pollsters, Elites, and Other
Difficulties, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1191, 1193–94 (2010) (“‘The People’ is a fiction”).
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rhetorical attention? Developing and presenting polling results provides a
limited, incomplete, but also concrete and replicable measure of what a
statistically valid sample of American voters believes about a set of issues.
With this approach, the devil we know can be far more valuable than the
devil we think we know but can only vaguely allude to.
Having helped identify the public, polling can deepen our understanding
of the degree to which the people as a whole seem engaged on
constitutional issues and capable of cogently discussing them. Scholars like
Larry Kramer fret that the rise of “judicial supremacy” has diminished the
public’s engagement with and ownership of our supreme law.6 Polling can
establish at least some of the parameters and referents for assessing these
concerns. In addition to the question of how much “dialogue” there is
between courts and the public, we also need a more complex account about
the nature, salience, and evolution of popular speech on constitutional
issues, and polling can assist in this regard.
B. The Value of Polls in Understanding Supreme Court Decisions
A second contribution of polling is to advance scholarly understanding
about the extent to which the public shapes the constitutional decisions of
the Supreme Court. Much of the work here has concluded that there is
substantial “covariation between the public’s ideological position and Court
policy,”7 that is, a fairly close tracking between the decisions of the Court
and the views of the public especially where the latter are stable and
relatively well defined. As one scholar concluded, over its history “the
Court has seldom lagged far behind or forged far ahead” of public opinion.8
Of course, these observations, even if accurate, raise the question: what
explains this correspondence? Scholars have attempted to answer this
query by investigating whether the views of the public impact the Court
through a spectrum of direct or indirect means—examining everything from
the public’s influence on political elites, to the play of public opinion in
selecting justices, to the place of popular majorities in shaping the kinds of
cases that emerge from lower courts and how legal issues are presented.9
6. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
REVIEW (2004) (discussing how judicial supremacy is the doctrine that the
courts have ultimate if not exclusive authority over constitutional questions).
7. Lawrence Baum, Jeff Yates’ Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the
Supreme Court, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 367, 370 (2005) (book review).
8. ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 225 (5th ed. 1960). See also
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 383 (2009) (“Over time,
sometimes a long period, public opinion jells, and the Court comes into line with the
considered views of the American public.”); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND
THE SUPREME COURT 192–93 (1989) (discussing the correlation between public opinion polls
taken during the Rehnquist Court and the results in most of those Court’s decisions).
9. See, e.g., JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 116
(1995) (reviewing the influence of public opinion on the Senate and the Supreme Court
appointment process); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 89 (1993) (discussing the justices’ broad awareness of
AND JUDICIAL
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We also note that while there is a substantial amount of polling data
pertaining to constitutional areas widely recognized as important, such as
abortion, gun control, and affirmative action, we are not aware of any
systematic effort to identify and track opinions on nascent or developing
controversies. Taking the public’s pulse on these issues can play a valuable
part in corroborating or suggesting limits to the “covariation” claim—that
the Court largely follows the broad outlines of public opinion.10 Stated
somewhat differently, these polls can create a clearer picture of when the
public’s influence on the Court is likely to be strong or weak, with the latter
perhaps including conditions such as when an issue has a low national
profile, or where the public’s views are ambivalent or sharply divided.
Survey research might also help identify plausible “tipping points” or the
initial circumstances in which it seems likely that the public’s views on
developing constitutional debates can have an impact on the Court and its
rulings.
In addition, a poll-based approach to understanding the public’s
constitutional views is valuable because the results can be broken down into
different demographic and political subgroups. A strong case can be made
that in our diverse, complex, far-flung republic, the American people can be
best understood as multiple publics, and that, rather than “majority rule” we
have “minorities rule, where one aggregation of minorities achieves policies
opposed by another aggregation.”11 Seen in this light, our capacity to use
polling to identify the views of subgroups in American politics can give us
unique insight into society’s struggles to shape Supreme Court decisions
and constitutional meaning.
Finally, one might also note that the Court itself sometimes invokes the
public’s purported beliefs, by occasionally citing polls when defending its
reasoning and legal opinions.12 Thus, having a record of reliable polling

public opinion and the willingness of some to “adjust” their decisions accordingly); William
B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzman v. Knott: Judicial Policy
Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135, 162 (2007) (making the
case that public opinion shaped how civil rights cases involving gays and lesbians came
before the Court); see also MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 193–95 (setting out numerous
models through which public opinion might influence Court rulings).
10. For example, one area where there may be a divergence between the public and a
Court ruling involves campaign finance and the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See Impressions of the Citizens United
Decision and a Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Overturn It, HART RESEARCH
ASSOCS. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/me10129b
_public.pdf (finding that a majority of Americans favor a constitutional amendment to
overturn the decision).
11. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 294 (1957).
12. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (referencing the views of the public in
opposing the implementation of the death penalty for the mentally retarded); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (relying on the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society”). See generally Susan J. Becker, Many Are Chilled, but Few Are Frozen:
How Transformative Learning in Popular Culture, Christianity, and Science Will Lead to the
Eventual Demise of Legally Sanctioned Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the
United States, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 177, 186 (2006) (discussing Justice
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results can help to substantiate, challenge, and contextualize the Court’s
own invocations of the “will of the people.”
C. Polling and the Court’s Influence
In addition to scholarly work examining the public’s impact on the Court, a
third set of studies has essentially inversed this relationship, considering
instead how the Court’s rulings affect the public’s views on constitutional
issues or about the Court itself. Broadly speaking, the consensus from these
studies is that Supreme Court decisions do not have much influence on
American public opinion. If there is a “dialogue” between courts and
citizens, there is not much evidence the Supreme Court is effectively
leading this discussion—given, among other factors, the inscrutability and
low profile of most Court opinions to most citizens.13 Notwithstanding
these observations, using our polling results to reexamine the nexus
between Supreme Court decision-making and public opinion is still
valuable. Judges, politicians, and educators continue to insist that the Court
serves as a leader in informing the public about constitutional protections
and rights. Therefore, setting out the public’s views on constitutional
matters prior to related Court rulings, and analyzing whether these views
are subsequently altered, would further test what has sometimes been called
the “Court as republican schoolmaster” thesis.14
More broadly, even while acknowledging that for many constitutional
areas, the Supreme Court has no impact on public opinion, Nathaniel
Persily argues that there may be circumstances in which the relationship is
more complex.15 Some Court decisions can lead to public “legitimation,”
shifting support in the direction of the Court’s decision, “backlash,”
objections to a decision simply because the Court has issued it, and
“polarization,” shifting views amongst different subgroups comprising “the
public.”16 These reactions seem to be issue- and even case-specific, an
example being how public opinion on “discretionary” abortions not related
to maternal health became more divided after Roe v. Wade.17 Therefore,
keeping tabs on the public’s views about constitutional matters before and
after a Court decision remains essential for teasing out the perhaps special
conditions under which our highest tribunal impacts popular viewpoints.18

Scalia’s invocation of public opinion about “persons who openly engage in homosexual
conduct”).
13. See PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 8 (Jack Citrin et al. eds.,
2008) (contending that in “the vast majority of the cases . . . Supreme Court decisions had no
effect on the overall distribution of public opinion”).
14. Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S.
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 751–52 (1989)
(discussing the idea that the Court serves as a “republican schoolmaster” to the nation on
constitutional and legal issues).
15. See PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 13, at 8.
16. See id.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. See Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 14, at 763–65 (discussing polling results about
the public’s views on abortion following Roe).
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D. Normative Questions and Beyond
A fourth and final application of polling to questions about
“constitutional dialogues” in society involves normative questions. For
example, we might wonder about the wider significance of today’s public
conversations about constitutional meaning, including the association, if
any, of popular constitutionalism with civic engagement. In addition,
public opinion about constitutional issues raises separate questions about
the most appropriate ways in which courts can identify and use this
information. Polling can be a useful tool in assessing the quality and
coherence of popular discourse on constitutional matters, and the extent to
which the public may need education about important constitutional
topics.19 Somewhat conversely, poll results may upset the conventional
wisdom about the public’s purported ignorance on constitutional matters, or
at least suggest we need new ways to discuss and evaluate constitutional
literacy.
It should also be noted that the “governance as dialogue” debate about
the relative importance and specific content of the public’s constitutional
beliefs does not exhaust the potential value of polling on emerging legal
issues. This information can also be useful, for example, in attempting to
understand a particular Court’s place and status in “political time”—that is,
in assessing its relative strength or vulnerability vis-à-vis the other branches
of government and in evaluating whether the Court is affiliated with or
departs from the prevalent political regime.20 Stated somewhat differently,
polls can help give us a reading of overall political conditions facing a
Court and whether its opinions are consonant with the public and opinion
leaders, or whether they instead suggest it may be out of step with the rest
of the nation, perhaps as a result of political realignment.21 Polling can also
help scholars wrestle with related questions of implementation: what are
the conditions under which Supreme Court opinions are likely to be
followed or transformed “on the ground,” viz., when legal commands need
to be put into action.
II. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The previous discussion underscores the intellectual utility and propriety
of polling the public on emerging constitutional controversies. What were
the actual findings with respect to popular views on pending issues from the
2010 term?
19. For one example pointing to the public’s somewhat mixed understanding of
constitutionalism and constitutional law, see Michael C. Dorf, Whose Constitution Is It
Anyway? What Americans Don’t Know About Our Constitution—and Why it Matters,
FINDLAW (May 29, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020529.html.
20. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 30 (1997) (discussing “political time”).
21. See Charles Geyh, The Choreography of Courts-Congress Conflicts, in THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 19–44 (Bruce Peabody ed.,
2010) (discussing the role of critical realignments in placing the Supreme Court at odds with
Congress).
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At the outset one might note that our cases can be divided into two
groups. In the first set, including Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn22 and Camreta v. Greene,23 the Court declined to rule
on the merits, instead handing down essentially procedural and
jurisdictional decisions. Our ability to analyze these cases and how they
relate to public opinion differs from the second group, Brown v. Plata24 and
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,25 in which the Supreme Court
handed down majority opinions on the substantive questions at issue.
A. Cases Not Decided on the Merits
Arizona Christian is a good place to begin because it highlights partisan
differences in the public’s views, as well as a degree of intuitive selfinterest amongst voters.26 The case dealt with the use of state tax credits to
offset donations to school tuition organizations, which in turn provided
scholarships to students attending private, religious schools.
Seven in ten voters reported they never heard of Arizona Christian or the
accompanying controversy but, despite that, 86 percent of respondents
offered a definite opinion about the case, while only 14 percent said they
were unsure or had mixed views.27
Democrats were twice as likely as Republicans28 to say that Arizona's tax
credits for supporting private schools, including religiously affiliated
schools, created a policy that supported religious schools.29 The partisan
difference is remarkable given that the case, like many others, was not
regularly in the news or talked about by party officials; in other words,
voters’ views on this issue are unlikely to reflect cues taken from opinion
leaders. We also note that partisan divisions amongst voters on this issue
arguably reflected divisions amongst the justices. The Court’s 5-4 decision
22. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
23. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
24. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
25. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
26. For complete results, including question wording and tables, see Press Release,
PublicMind, Public Blesses Arizona Christian School Tuition (April 4, 2011),
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/taxcredits/.
27. The willingness of voters to weigh in on a case, despite their lack of familiarity with
it, might point to the capacity of polls to generate opinions that did not previously exist.
This critique that citizens do not navigate through life with polling categories in mind, and
therefore that surveys “create” voter views as much as they reflect them, is an objection we
discuss in our companion piece. See Peter J. Woolley & Bruce G. Peabody, Polls, the Public,
and Popular Perspectives on Constitutional Issues, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 22, 27
(2011).
28. In our polls, partisanship was self-identified, that is, respondents placed themselves
in a particular party or no party at all.
29. In asking our respondents about Arizona Christian, we sought to avoid entanglement
with some of the complexities of the Arizona tuition policy by focusing on “parents who
send their children to private schools, including schools with religious affiliations.” Press
Release, supra note 26. Strictly speaking, however, any citizens were eligible to donate to
“student tuition organizations” and receive tax credits. Thus, in this case, our effort to
provide an accessible poll question came with the price of not achieving complete accuracy
in describing the underlying state policy.
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held that the challengers to the Arizona tax credit law lacked standing to
sue, with the consequence that the policy was allowed to stand. This result
was formed by a majority comprised of the Court’s conservative justices,
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and the more moderate Justice Kennedy.
The Court’s liberal wing dissented. Given the substantial degree of Court
division on this “partisan” dimension throughout the 2010 term, Arizona
Christian is something of a bellwether.30
Another intriguing finding in this case is how the results indicate that
different age cohorts have distinctive views. Voters aged 30 to 44 were
only half as likely as other age groups to say that the tax credits essentially
support religious schools, and they were significantly more likely than other
age groups to say the tax credits support parents’ right to choose schools.
Perhaps not coincidently, this age group includes parents rearing school-age
children. This result also suggests respondents are able to discern a certain
self-interest in the answer categories, despite a lack of knowledge about the
case.
Overall, the results in Arizona Christian, with three in five voters
supporting Arizona’s credit system for religious schools, indicate that the
public’s views on this matter have changed substantially since the late
nineteenth century, when a majority of states passed laws restricting and
even prohibiting the use of public funds by parochial schools.31
The second, “procedurally decided” case concerned an issue of the
criminal justice system and uncovered differences in views by both
ethnicity and gender. Camreta involved a nine-year-old girl in Oregon who
was questioned for two hours by a deputy sheriff and a social worker about
possible sexual abuse by her father.32 The questioning took place without a
court order and without the mother’s knowledge.33
Again, and not surprisingly, the overwhelming number of voters, more
than four in five, reported not having heard anything about the case.
However, only 13 percent said they were unsure or “mixed” in their opinion
on the dispute.34 Nearly three in five of our respondents said the parents
must be informed unless there is a court order or immediate danger, while
only one in three said a minor had to be questioned without permission,
given the possible abuse at home.35

30. SCOTUSblog reports that during the 2010 term, the “Court split along traditional
ideological lines in an incredible 87% of 5-4 decisions, the highest rate in the last ten years,”
Kedar Bhatia, Final October Term 2010 Stat Pack Available, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2011,
5:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/final-october-term-2010-stat-pack-available.
31. William W. Bassett, Changing Perceptions of Private Religious Schools: Public
Money and Public Trust in the Education of Children, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 243, 247–48.
32. 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2021–24 (2011).
33. See id.
34. For complete results, including question wording and tables, see Press Release,
PublicMind, U.S. Public Rejects Interrogation of Minors Without Parental Knowledge—
Even
when
Domestic
Abuse
Is
Suspected
(May
26,
2011),
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/4thamend.
35. Our respondents were not told the age of the child out of concern that limiting the
question to a particular age would also limit the ability to generalize the results.
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Interestingly, in this case, there were no differences in either partisanship
or ideology. In other words, Republicans were just as likely as Democrats
to agree with informing the parents, and self-described liberals were just as
likely as conservatives to say parents should be informed. The differences
that did emerge were, first, in gender: women were considerably more
likely than men to say the authorities should be permitted to interrogate the
child because the questioning is about abuse at home. While further study
is needed, these preliminary results may point to society’s continued
associations with women and mothers as the primary “protectors” of
children, and may also reflect a pragmatic awareness in female respondents
that the initiators of domestic violence and sexual abuse are most likely to
be males who are often related to the victim.36
At the same time, non-whites were significantly less likely than whites to
say that authorities should proceed to interrogate the child and more likely
than whites to say the parents need to be informed. These results could
reflect more general suspicions by many non-white citizens about the good
intentions and performance of law enforcement.37
B. Cases Decided on the Merits
Plata is another criminal justice case, concerning California’s prison
overcrowding.38 Perhaps predictably, given the general shift towards
greater conservatism in criminal justice matters over the past half century,
the public was overwhelmingly against a court-ordered release of prisoners:
63 percent said that even if conditions in the prisons were bad, the Court
should not order a release of “criminals.” Only 25 percent agreed with the
proposition that the prisons were so overcrowded, and conditions so bad,
that some prisoners should be let go.39
Plata also brought out the public’s partisan leanings, as well as the
Court’s. Self-described conservatives were more likely than the general
public to be against prisoner release, opposed by a margin of 74 to 16
percent. Meanwhile, self-described liberals were more ambivalent, with 40
36. See Ryan C. W. Hall and Richard C. W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition,
Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82
MAYO CLINIC PROC. 457, 459 (2007) (reviewing data showing that males were the most
frequent pedophilia offenders and that “[f]ifty percent of offenses committed against
children younger than 6 years were committed by a family member, as were 42% of acts
committed against children 6 to 11 years old”); Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Married Parents’ Use of Time, 2003–06 (May 8, 2008), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
pdf/atus2.pdf (reviewing data showing that “[m]arried mothers employed full time were
more likely to . . . provide childcare on an average day” than their male spouses).
37. This finding is also reflected in other PublicMind surveys. See, e.g., Press Release,
PublicMind, Trusting the System:
Democrats vs. Republicans (Oct. 17, 2006),
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/cj0610; Press Release, PublicMind, Blacks and Whites Differ on
Trust
in
State’s
Criminal
Justice
System
(July
24,
2006),
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/blackwhitetrust.
38. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
39. For complete results, including question wording and tables, see Press Release,
PublicMind, U.S. Voters Weigh in on Brown v. Plata: Case Concerning Prison
Overcrowding (May 23, 2011), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/brownvplata.
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percent recommending prisoner release and 48 percent not recommending
release. The public’s ideological differences were largely reflected in the
split of the Court. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, joined
by Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg. Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Alito and Roberts dissented. Justice Scalia’s dissent may have
captured the seemingly strong judgments of the public on this issue: “One
would think that, before allowing the decree of a federal district court to
release 46,000 convicted felons, this Court would bend every effort to read
the law in such a way as to avoid that outrageous result.”40
Like Camreta, Plata also yielded interesting findings on gender and race.
African Americans were twice as likely as whites to recommend some
prisoners be released. Meanwhile, there was no statistical difference
between white and Latino respondents. But there was a difference between
men and women. Men were 50 percent more likely than women to
recommend prisoner release, with one in three men saying some should be
let go, but only one in five women. At least two explanations may account
for these differences.
First, we might speculate that given the
disproportionate amount of males in the penal system, men are more likely
to have some sympathy for ameliorating poor prison conditions. This
hypothesis would need more corroboration since we do not generally find
greater leniency amongst men on criminal justice matters. Alternatively,
the different views may reflect varied assessments of the risk posed by the
potential release of thousands of prisoners back into society.
The final case we polled, Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,41 involved
parental prerogatives like Camreta, but the results leaned in a very different
direction. The core question in the case was whether the state should be
able to regulate the sale of violent video games to minors the way it already
controls cigarettes and alcohol, or whether it is parents who should decide
what video games their children consume. Rather than wanting to retain
parental supervision, voters weighing in on the “violent video game” case
tended to support the state’s authority to regulate products deemed harmful
to children.42
Just 39 percent of voters preferred leaving video game supervision to
parents, with 57 percent saying the state should step in. There was no
difference between Republicans and Democrats on the question, but
political independents were significantly more likely than partisans to say
the state should regulate video game sales. In addition, women, more likely
to be the primary caregiver to children than men, were also more likely to
favor state regulation. To some degree these results echo the gender
differences in Camreta, in which women were more likely than men to
allow the state to interrogate minors without parental permission. On the

40. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1950 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
42. For complete results, including question wording and tables, see Press Release,
PublicMind, U.S. Public Says Regulate Violent Video Games, the Focus of Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants (June 6, 2011), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/vmerchants.
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other hand, voters under 45 were more likely than those over 45 to think
parents should have the role of regulating video game consumption.
CONCLUSION
Our venture into public polling on emerging constitutional controversies
is preliminary and only suggestive. Nevertheless, in addition to the specific
observations noted above, we point to several broader conclusions from our
cases.
To begin, we are encouraged that the polls suggest the public’s capacity
for a wider conversation about constitutional matters. Despite voters’ lack
of knowledge of, and information about, specific cases, they were willing
and largely able to decide how they felt about the substantive issues in those
cases. Partly related, and corroborating our judgment that we have selected
suitable cases for exploring the “government as dialogue” thesis, we note
that the featured Court decisions have already prompted discussion and
debate amongst elected officials and private citizens over the constitutional
issues at hand.43
Second, the public’s perspective on the constitutional issues we surveyed
does not obviously and consistently track party, ideology, or attitudes
towards government. While partisanship was an important factor in the
public’s views on tax credits and prisoner release, it was not a factor in the
violent video game case or the question of interrogating minors without
parental consent. Somewhat similarly, of the three cases touching on
parental prerogatives, the Camreta findings rejected the state’s authority,
the Entertainment Merchants Ass’n findings endorsed the state’s authority,
and the Arizona Christian findings offered a mixed decision, with those
polled endorsing the ability of states to incentivize school choice. Strong
public support for regulation of video games and continued detention of
prisoners arguably points to widespread embrace of the “core” government
function of protecting citizens against violence. But, in any event, this
speculation and our results suggest we may need a different vocabulary and
set of metrics for describing the public perspective on constitutional issues,
something distinct from our traditional “left-right” nomenclature or partisan
categories.
We conclude by noting that two of our cases represent examples where
the Court could be seen as pitted against the public in a prominent way. In
both Plata and Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court entered
judgments that were at odds with what a clear majority of the public
favored. Of these two cases, however, we think only one has a plausible
chance of being a source of persistent conflict between the high bench and
private citizens.
43. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Reject Ban on Violent Video Games for Children,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A1 (quoting the chief executive of a major video game
developer who praised the Court for affirming “the constitutional rights of game developers”
along with the rights of parents and “store owners”); Dan Lungren, Op-Ed., Another View:
Releasing Prisoners Has a Violent Precedent, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 29, 2011, at 3E
(arguing against overturning the video game regulation law).
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The violent video game case is part of a pattern of sometimes unpopular
“free speech” cases that have not produced entrenched popular hostility,
because the issues have a temporary political shelf life and the interested
parties often make modifications of the challenged policies to accommodate
judicial concerns.44 But Plata, and its underlying value choice, is less
likely to go away. Given the inevitability of crime, the enduring popularity
of incarceration as a political strategy, and the likelihood that state budgets
will remain strained for the foreseeable future, additional decisions like
Plata could produce greater tension between the courts and the public. This
is especially true because this is an issue politicians are likely to happily
cede to the courts—putting judges, not elected officials, in the way of an
inflamed public. On the other hand, this case may turn out to be the
exception that proves the rule, and it would not surprise us to see future
courts once again falling in line with the public and backing away from the
Plata precedent. But either way, we will only know what we know because
of our measure of the public’s opinion on emerging constitutional issues, an
initiative we look forward to carrying into the future.

44. See Press Release, Senator Leland Yee, U.S. Supreme Court Puts Corporate Interests
Before Protecting Kids (June 27, 2011), http://dist08.casen.govoffice.com/
index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7BEFA496BC-EDC8-4E38-9CC768D37AC03DFF%7D&DE=%7B25F3EB3A-3F71-4121-9107-1D6B06F65872%7D
(pledging to examine whether a more narrowly tailored law might pass the Court’s review).

